April 16, 2025
By Christine St. Marie 
A crucial factor that is often missed when seeking Judicial Review is the timeframe within which it should be done. The purpose of this article is not so much to delve into the administrative law remedy of Judicial Review itself but to look at the specific aspect of its timeline as governed by the Judicial Review Act Chapter 7:08 (“JRA”) and the Part 56 of Civil Procedure Rules ("CPR") 1998 as amended.
However, it would be remiss of me to speak of the above without first defining Judicial Review and when it can be sought. Judicial Review is the procedure by which the High Court can review an administrative action, omission or the decision-making processes of inferior Courts, tribunals, public bodies, public authorities or persons who have been conferred with powers by Parliament to exercise public duties or functions in accordance with any law. (See Section 5(1) of the JRA)
The Requirement for Leave to Apply Leave must be granted for Judicial Review pursuant to Section 6 of the JRA. The Application for leave must be supported by Affidavit. Conditions for Granting Leave The Court will only grant such leave where it is satisfied that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates or in accordance with Section 7 of the JRA, where it is satisfied that the application is justifiable in the public interest. The Court must also be satisfied that there is an arguable ground for judicial review having a realistic prospect of success. For instance, in the case of Jaiwantie Ramdass (Respondent) v Minister of Finance and another (Appellants) (Trinidad and Tobago), in which the judicial review challenged the Minister’s recommendation (accepted by the Cabinet) to appoint an investigation team whose members and terms of reference were determined by him, the Appellants challenged the granting of leave for Judicial Review in the lower Court however they were unsuccessful due to the fact that “none of the arguments raised by the appellants cross the high threshold required for the Court of Appeal’s grant of leave to be reversed”. The Court said the appellants also failed to establish a “knockout blow” to either ground or to demonstrate that the Court of Appeal was plainly wrong to grant leave to apply for judicial review. On the contrary, the respondent’s case on both grounds was arguable, with a realistic prospect of success. Section 5 (2) of the JRA states: The Court may, on an application for judicial review, grant relief in accordance with this Act-- (a) to a person whose interests are adversely affected by a decision; or (b) to a person or a group of persons if the Court is satisfied that the application is justifiable in the public interest in the circumstances of the case. The grounds for Judicial Review as listed in Section 3 of the JRA are as follows: (a) that the decision was in any way unauthorised or contrary to law; (b) excess of jurisdiction; (c) failure to satisfy or observe conditions or procedures required by law; (d) breach of the principles of natural justice; (e) unreasonable, irregular or improper exercise of discretion; (f) abuse of power; (g) fraud, bad faith, improper purpose or irrelevant consideration; (h) acting on instructions from an unauthorised person; (i) conflict with the policy of an Act; (j) error of law, whether or not apparent on the face of the record; (k) absence of evidence on which a finding or assumption of fact could reasonably be based; (l) breach of or omission to perform a duty; (m) deprivation of a legitimate expectation; (n) a defect in form or a technical irregularity resulting in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice; or (o) an exercise of a power in a manner that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power. These grounds can be categorized under three fundamental heads highlighted by Lord Diplock in the case of Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] UKHL 9 as follows: i. Illegality, ii. Irrationality (unreasonableness) and iii. Procedural Impropriety. Note, Section 4 of the JRA states: “An applicant is not limited to the grounds set out in the application for judicial review but if the applicant wishes to rely on any other ground not so set out, the Court may, on such terms as it thinks fit, direct that the application be amended to specify such other ground.” Section 5 (6) of the JRA also provides: “Where a person or group of persons aggrieved or injured by reason of any ground referred to in paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsection (3), is unable to file an application for judicial review under this Act on account of poverty, disability, or socially or economically disadvantaged position, any other person or group of persons acting bona fide can move the Court under this section for relief under this Act.” Even before one seeks Judicial Review, it is prudent to ascertain whether there are alternative remedies that can be sought as Section 9 of the JRA makes it clear that the Court shall not grant permission to an applicant for judicial review of a decision where an alternative procedure exists, save in exceptional circumstances. There are other critical aspects of Judicial Review which normally arise in litigation for instance, what is a “public body”? I will address this in a future article but for now, let us focus on the timing issue. 
Strict Timeline for Judicial Review Part 56 of the CPR governs the procedure in applying for Judicial Review. One thing to note about those Rules is that they must be adhered to, otherwise face the repercussions, which by the way, may be fatal to one’s case. Section 11 of the JRA also deals with delay and provides that an application for judicial review “shall be made promptly and in any event within three (3) months from the date when the grounds for the application first arose unless … there is good reason for extending” that time period. (See Gajadhar v Public Service Commission Civil Appeal No. P170 of 2012). Once leave is granted, the Applicant must file a substantive application for Judicial Review via a Fixed Date Claim Form, supported by Affidavit, within fourteen (14 days) as per Rule 56 of the CPR. The good news however, is that the granting of leave is discretionary. Rule 56.5 of the CPR states: (1) The judge may refuse leave or to grant relief in any case in which he considers that there has been unreasonable delay before making the application. (2) Where the application is for leave to make a claim for an order of certiorari the general rule is that the application must be made within three months of the proceedings to which it relates. (3) When considering whether to refuse leave or to grant relief because of delay the judge must consider whether the granting of leave or relief would be likely to-- (a) cause substantial hardship to or substantially prejudice the rights of any person; or (b) be detrimental to good administration. In Fishermen and Friends of the Sea v Environmental Management Authority (unreported) 30 August 2002 (HCA No 1715 of 2002) (“Fishermen 1”), the applicant sought leave to bring judicial review of a decision to grant a certificate of environmental clearance to BP Trinidad and Tobago (“BPTT”). Objection was made on grounds of delay, the application having been filed more than three months after the decision was made. Bereaux J, sitting at first instance, drew attention to the judgment of Ackner LJ in R v Stratford-on-Avon District Council, Ex p Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 1319, which was approved in the House of Lords in R v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales, Ex p Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738, decisions which, although not binding, he considered highly persuasive. His summary of the law as stated in those cases included the following: “If there is good reason shown for extending time, the court may grant an extension. But even if the court considers that there is good reason, it may still refuse leave if the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause hardship or prejudice or be detrimental to good administration.” (N.B. At the date of this decision there was in force in Trinidad and Tobago a rule of court similar to Part 56.5. Order 53(4)(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1975 (as substituted by The Supreme Court (Amendment) (No 3) Rules 1982) which provided: “Subject to the provisions of this rule, where in any case the court considers that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review or, in a case to which paragraph (2) applies, the application for leave under rule 3 is made after the relevant period has expired, the court may refuse to grant-- (a) leave for the making of the application, or (b) any relief sought on the application, if, in the opinion of the court, the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.” The judge then followed a structured approach: First, he considered whether good reason had been shown for extending the time for issuing proceedings. There was no contest that the application was outside the three month period and that therefore there had been undue delay. Having considered the submissions of the parties, he concluded that no good reason had been put forward for the grant of an extension of time. Prejudice and detriment were not considered at this stage. Secondly, he considered whether the extension of time or the grant of relief would be prejudicial to the BPTT or detrimental to good administration. The judge declined to adjourn this issue to the substantive hearing. There had been full argument on the issue and the BPTT had provided evidence of the prejudice it would suffer if the judicial review were to proceed and relief were to be granted. The judge concluded that during the hiatus of five and a half months BPTT had proceeded substantially to implement the project. He considered that this weighed heavily against the grant of leave, in particular when considered in light of the applicant’s failure to give any notice of its intention to bring legal proceedings. In his view there would be significant prejudice to BPTT. In addition, it was important to good administration that the decision should be treated with decisiveness and finality. The judge then, thirdly, went on to consider whether the public interest required that the application should be permitted to proceed. Having referred to the decision of Laws J in R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ex p Greenpeace Ltd [1998] Env LR 415 (“Greenpeace 1”) and that of Maurice Kay J in R v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Ex p Greenpeace Ltd [2000] Env LR 221 (“Greenpeace 2”), he concluded that the balance came down against the grant of leave. On appeal, the Court of Appeal (Jones CJ (Ag) and Nelson JA, Lucky JA dissenting) (unreported) 14 August 2003 dismissed the appeal. Nelson JA, with whom the Chief Justice agreed, considered that the sole issue was whether Bereaux J had properly exercised his discretion in refusing to extend time. There was, in his view, no ground for interfering with that exercise of discretion. Lucky JA dissented on the ground that the judge had, by refusing an extension of time, pre-empted important issues in the case. The applicant appealed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: [2005] UKPC 32. Delivering the judgment of the Board, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe observed that the judge had correctly analysed the effect of the relevant authorities in England and Wales, including Caswell. He drew attention to the structured approach followed by the judge. The question whether the applicant had shown a good reason for the extension of time arose under section 11(1). The judge had then gone on to consider two topics specifically mentioned under section 11(2), whether there would be substantial prejudice to the rights of BPTT or detriment to good administration, before considering the public interest. It is of some significance to the present appeal that, as the Board read the judgment of Bereaux J, he had expressed a preliminary view against granting an extension of time because of the unjustifiable delay, but then went on to test that conclusion against other issues, including the public interest and the strengths and weaknesses of the applicant’s case. Those other matters confirmed his preliminary view. The Board concluded, dismissing the appeal, that there was no reason to interfere with the decision not to grant an extension of time. The above authority is found in the case of Maharaj (Appellant) v National Energy Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago (Respondent) (Trinidad and Tobago) Privy Council Appeal No 0085 of 2017, which explores a range of authority on the issue of delay in applying for Judicial Review. In that case, the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal (Jamadar, Bereaux and Smith JJA). The issues on the appeal were, having regard to section 11 of the Judicial Review Act, 2000 and rule 56.5 of the Civil Proceedings Rules 1998, as follows: (1) Whether the judge erred in concluding that there had been unreasonable delay in the filing of the appellant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review; (2) If not, whether he erred in declining to exercise his discretion to extend time for judicial review and in refusing leave on this basis alone without consideration of other factors including whether the delay was such as to “substantially prejudice the rights of any person” or to be “detrimental to good administration”; and (3) If not, whether he had in any event erred in setting aside his prior grant of leave on this basis. The appeal was allowed. Remedies Section 8 of the JRA sets out the forms of relief that the Court may grant. These include: a. an order of mandamus (an order compelling persons to do particular things), prohibition or certiorari (an order quashing the decision and possibly remitting to the lower court); b. a declaration or injunction; c. an injunction under section 19; or d. such other orders, directions or writs as it considers just and as the circumstances warrant. In appropriate cases, the Court may award damages and may grant in addition or alternatively an order for restitution or for the return of property, real or personal. 
Christine St. Marie is an Associate Attorney at Aurora Chambers. She can be reached at a[email protected].
Important Notice: This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Always seek consultation with an attorney for your specific legal concerns, as only a professional familiar with the details of your situation can provide proper guidance. This website is managed by AURORA Chambers; a law practice in Trinidad and Tobago. Click HERE to receive updates straight to your inbox by subscribing to our newsletter.
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